CHAPTER V.

OUR GOVERNMENT’S CONDUCT OF THE WAR

Our Unpreparedness.—To understand the magnitude of what we were called upon to accomplish, we must realize both our unpreparedness and our slowness in taking the necessary steps toward efficiency. We were utterly unprepared for war when we entered upon it in April, 1917. There had been a world war for over two years and a half, bringing into use revolutionary war agencies and methods; and we had been for nearly two years, since the Lusitania disaster, in danger of being drawn into it. Yet we had done nothing—less than nothing—for we had not only not provided for an increase of our army but we had not properly equipped the small army we had. Private firms were manufacturing enormous quantities of munitions for our allies, but our army had practically no artillery ammunition. We had no military aircraft worth mentioning; no trench bombs; few motor trucks, no reserve of clothing, equipment, tents; no camps or barracks. We had no poison gas, gas masks, fire-flingers, gas bombs, or grenades. We had no modern rifles and no machine guns, which had now been shown to be a most essential equipment of infantry. We had practically none of the newly developed elements of marine warfare, submarines, destroyers, hydroplanes; while the few submarines we had were almost wholly unprovided with torpedoes. We were even without the plans, tools, and apparatus necessary for manufacturing what we needed.

When the break came the most important question was: could the old army organization handle the new situation, or must new machinery be created? There followed ;in interval of experimentation, which involved considerable delay in settling on the best and final plan. It was at once evident that more and more power must reside in our chief executive. Our war policies were determined and the new machinery for executing them created by the President, acting under the authorization of Congress which, regardless of party or precedent, more and more delegated its powers to him, so that he became virtually the dictator of our policies and methods.

New War Machinery.—The keynote of these policies and methods was Government regulation of production and activity. The Government took from civil life a number of men for public service and often put them in charge of the new departments. The rather chaotic transitional period lasted for nearly a year after the war began. Then results began to be achieved.

What were the principal new agencies? There were five principal non-military war agencies: The Federal Food Administration, the Federal Fuel Administration, the War Trade Board, the War Industries Board, and the War Labor Board. Another important agency of a general character was the Council of National Defence, branches of which were, organized in many places. It produced, among others, the War Industries Board.

Other important organizations were; The U. S. Employment Service, under the Department of Labor; the War Finance Corporation and the Essential Industries Finance Corporation. The tremendous and vital problem of overseas transportation was entrusted to the Shipping Board and to the Emergency Fleet Corporation.

The Government decided to assume the management of practically all public utilities. The Railroads, the Telephone and Telegraph Companies, the Express Companies, and finally, the Cable Companies, were all put under the direction of either Mr. McAdoo, the then Secretary of the Treasury, or of the Postmaster- General, Mr: Burleson.

In the case of the railroads, the Government realized that it had fatally crippled them by the hostile attitude shown ever since the punitive legislation of 1909 under the administration of Mr. Taft. Forbidden as they were to increase their rates, the companies had been unable to replace worn-out equipment, much less to expand. They were now under government control given much more than under private ownership they had ever dared to ask in the raising of both freight and passenger rates, as well as the previously denied pooling privilege.

The question of suitable transportation by sea was another difficult problem. We had no American merchant marine. The little which had existed had been killed a few years before by the legislation of the Seaman’s Act. We had to create an immense merchant marine out of practically nothing. Our new army and its equipment and supplies, as well as food for the Allies had to be taken to Europe. We therefore commandeered the German passenger ships in our ports, the machinery of which had been destroyed; we arranged to take over some neutral (especially Dutch) and some Japanese shipping, and meanwhile we developed a whole chain of busy shipbuilding yards from one end of the country to the other. But we could not have managed without the help of England, for not only did England furnish a large part of the protection that enabled us to carry over the constant stream of men and material in safety, but over 50 per cent. of our army was actually carried in English ships.

The Council of National Defense.—The Council of National Defense was created by Act of Congress on August 29, 1916, to create “relations which render possible in time of need, the immediate concentration and the utilization of the resources of the nation.”

“Since the declaration of war . . . (it) has concentrated its efforts on the mobilization of industries, resources, and people of the United States for the effective conduct of the war. The Council . . . consists of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Agriculture, Interior, Commerce, and Labor, assisted by an Advisory Commission of Seven Experts. . . . It extended its organization into the States in two ways: first, by appealing to the governors of each State to create State Councils of Defense similar in function to the Council of National Defence; and second, by appointing a Woman’s Committee to direct, and organize the war work of women. . . . The Woman’s Committee (also) extended its organization into the States by the creation of State divisions.

“The State Councils of Defence are the official war emergency organizations of the States entrusted with the execution of all the work of the State relating to the war . . . —(J. P. Lichtenberger, in Annals of Am. Acad. of Political and Social Science. September, 1918, No, 168, “War Relief Work,” p. 229)

The activities of the forty-eight State Councils were managed by the Field Division, which kept in touch with some 184,000 separate units, in the state, county, municipal, and community organizations.

The Work of the War Industries Board.—Broadly speaking this Board had to see that there was an adequate flow of all materials needed by the two great war-making agencies, the Army and the Navy, and the two organizations that most directly supported the fighting machine—the Emergency Fleet Corporation and the Railroad Administration. The Board at the same time provided the supplies necessary to the military needs of our Allies, together with the commodities urgently required by neutrals.

The Board had also, in alliance with the Food, Fuel, and Labor Administrations, to provide for the country’s civilian needs. Its duty was not only to expand and stimulate production in industries essential to the winning of the war, but to protect, so far as possible the industries not immediately necessary to the war programme.

In its operations the Board expanded the production of materials necessary to the war programme and contracted the output of those that were not of prime need. This was accomplished by regulating the use of the basic economic elements: (a) Facilities, (b) Materials, (c) Fuel, (d) Transportation, (e) Labor, and (f) Capital. The Priority List was the key that opened the door of access to the six basic elements named. The Board had the right of commandeering industries. Food and fuel were administered separately, but over every other article of military need and of civilian life the Board had direct control and it had indirect control of food and fuel, as both required for their distribution or production other materials or facilities that might be withheld or supplied by the organization. America was the source of supply and the dependence of all the other powers, for the material needed in resisting Germany’s attempt to dominate the world. Most Americans had never appreciated the magnitude of these requirements or the all-embracing economies that had to be practiced here if they were to be met. By curtailing useless types, manufacturing complications were minimized, labor was saved, stocks both of raw material and manufactured articles were reduced, and the drain on fuel, transportation, and capital was diminished.—(Adapted from Price and Spillane, World’s Work, October 1918.)

Raw Materials.—Perhaps the biggest problem, at the beginning, for the Council of National Defense, was the mobilizing of the raw materials absolutely necessary for the prosecution of the war. The first important case was copper. Its use in shells and cartridges, in ships, in electrical apparatus, made it indispensable. The government would need 40 to .50 million pounds of copper at once. The market price of copper was then about 30 cents a pound. It was arranged that the government should take it at 16 2/3 cents a pound, a price based on the pre-war average of the ten previous years. This precedent was followed by the men in charge of the lead industry. The steel men made a price of $2.90 for plate, which was to be used in enormous quantities and for which the market price was more than double that rate. The same thing happened with high-grade zinc, which was selling at 26 cents a pound. It was reduced to 11 1/2 cents; the aluminum producers came down to 27 cents a pound from a market price of 50 cents. This was followed, too, in chemicals and explosives.— (Summarized from David Lawrence’s article in the Saturday Evening Post, August 3, 1918.)

Government Regulation of the Public.—The Government also entered deeply into the problems of our private life. Through the Food Administration it told us what to eat, what not to eat, and how to save; it tried to regulate as much as possible the market prices. Through the Fuel Administration it sought to apportion equitably the insufficient supply of coal, engineer its distribution, and prevent profiteering. Through the War Industries Board it divided industries into classes which should be discriminated for or against, as essential or non-essential in war time. Private individuals had to face considerable hardship; private building was stopped; many classes of manufactured articles for private use were no longer manufactured.

The Government and Labor.—It was essential for the government to have a clear understanding with organized labor. As the National War Labor Board declared: “This war is not only a war of arms; it is a war of workshops. It is a gigantic competition in the quantitative production and distribution of munitions and war supplies. It is a contest in industrial resourcefulness and energy.”

Officially speaking, labor through its unions, especially the American Federation of Labor stood staunchly back of the government. It labelled war strikes, treachery to the country. It endorsed the decisions of the War Labor Board in labor disputes brought before it for settlement. It used its great influence on European labor organizations to free labor from the insidious virus of international pacifism that seeks to undermine patriotism. The government threatened to draft exempted men such as miners or mechanics who went on strike. This plan it threatened to apply in two rather prominent cases: in the Bridgeport strike of machinists (September, 1918) and in the proposed walk-out of the Pennsylvania anthracite coal miners in the same month. In the Bridgeport case President Wilson sent a scathing letter with the famous “work or fight” ultimatum; and a similar ultimatum was sent to the coal miners by Mr. Garfield. In both cases the Government won, and the men went to work.

It is true however, that, notwithstanding the loyalty of organized labor, there were numerous strikes. In fact there never were nearly as many in this country as during the war. Nearly a million and a half workmen left their work for a time and accounts of more than 3,000 strikes have been published. Many were due to disloyal propaganda by the I. W. W., by anarchists, by pacifists, by German agents.

Employment of Labor.—One of the most useful government agencies was the U. S. Employment Service of the War Labor Policies Board, which took charge of the mobilization of labor. It tried to get the right persons, in the right places with the least loss of time, by dividing the country into labor zones, and obtaining a suitable position for every one within his own zone, so as to avoid loss of time and unnecessary expense in transportation.

Since the armistice the shutting down of many war industries has brought up grave problems of unemployment and possibilities of unrest. Organized labor has joined hands with the U. S. Employment Service in attempting to solve these problems as they arise. It is not only the elaborate shifting of employment that has caused trouble, but the questions of hours and wages. The reduction of working hours to an eight-hour schedule, and the tremendous increase in wage rates, including one and a half or even double rates for overtime and Sunday work have produced an entirely new standard of living in many fields of labor.

The Government has helped to bring labor and capital together, to work on a common basis for action and agreement, which it is hoped, will have a lasting effect.

Cost of the War.—It is roughly estimated that the cost of the war for the Allies, including the United States, has been about 200 billions of dollars. In November, 1918, it was figured that our war expenses had been about 20 billion to date and would be about 30 billion up to July, 1919, an average of over a billion a month, in an ever increasing ratio. The five Liberty Loans brought in subscriptions to Government Bonds and Notes, aggregating over 21 billions. But it must not be forgotten that nearly one-third of this went in loans to the Allies.

The money was raised in two ways beside that of the Liberty Loans; by enormously increased taxation, and by War Saving and Thrift Stamps. The stamps secured a total of about a billion and a half, a figure far exceeding all original expectations. The increased taxation differed radically from that carried out in England in that it affected the rich and the corporations much more severely, and taxed more slightly the smaller incomes. The amount raised by taxation to June, 1918, was about 4 billion, and the 1919 taxes were intended to yield some 6 billions, making a total of 10 billion raised by taxation for financing the war.

Loans to Farmers and Industries.—Through the agency of the Federal Reserve Banks the Government has made immense loans to the farmers of the country, especially for the moving of the crops. After the organization of the 12 Federal Farm Loan Banks in March, 1917, the farmers were loaned up to November, 1918 the sum of $140,000,000 by the Farm Loan Board.

What the Colleges Have Done.—In September, 1916, the War Department, in order to increase the supply of commissioned officers under authorization of Congress, started at certain colleges and universities units of Reserve Officers’ Training Corps. In these noted R. O. T. C. units the undergraduates combined the military drill and instruction with regular college work. The men went from college to the Officers’ Training Camps, which were first established a month after we entered the war. There had been danger, before the establishment of the R. O. T. C., that the colleges would be deserted. This would have meant the loss of a chance to train men who could shortly be of infinitely greater service as specialists and officers, in the fields of engineering, electricity, chemistry, mechanics, and all studies in the field of the application of science to industry.

With the tremendous enlargement of our army by the extension of the draft age to include all men between 18 and 45, came the creation of the, Student’s Army Training Corps (S. A. T. C.). These S. A. T. C. units filled the 500 colleges to the limits of their capacities, and temporarily revolutionized their teaching. This arrangement ended in December, 1918, before it had been possible to test the merits of the experiment.

The Investigation of Enemy Property.—Another important government activity was that of the Alien Property Custodian, which used part of the government detective system. An extraordinary condition was discovered in certain fields. For example German pacific penetration had aimed at gaining control of certain important raw materials necessary for the manufacture of war munitions and other war essentials. German money was poured out like water to buy up certain companies, doing it for the most part secretly, as in the case of the Bridgeport Projectile Company. Property to the extent of several hundred millions was seized and sold by this custodian to patriotic Americans.

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